We empirically analyze the information hypothesis that the separation of a "rm's divisions into independently traded units through a spin-o! enhances value because it mitigates information asymmetry about the "rm. Consistent with this hypothesis, we "nd that "rms that engage in spin-o!s have higher levels of information asymmetry compared to their industry and size matched counterparts and the information problems decrease signi"cantly after the spin-o!. The gains around spin-o!s are positively related to the degree of information asymmetry, and this relation is more pronounced for "rms with fewer negative synergies between divisions. Finally, "rms with higher growth opportunities and "rms in need of external capital show a higher propensity to engage in spin-o!s. They also raise more capital following a spin-o!, which is consistent with the view that * Corresponding author. Tel.: #1-504-280-6488; fax: #1-504-280-6397.
Introduction
Over the last decade, mergers, acquisitions, and other forms of expansion in operations have declined sharply, and many conglomerates have resorted to downsizing and focusing their businesses to their core competencies. A corporate spin-o! is one of several ways in which a "rm may divest a division and improve its focus. A spin-o! is a pro-rata distribution of the shares of a "rm's subsidiary to the shareholders of the "rm. There is neither a dilution of equity nor a transfer of ownership from the current shareholders. After the distribution, the operations and management of the subsidiary are separated from those of the parent. Spin-o!s constitute a unique mode of divesting assets since they involve no cash transactions. Thus, they cannot be motivated by a desire to generate cash to pay o! debt, as is often the case with other modes of divestitures.
Extant literature documents a positive stock price reaction around announcements of spin-o!s. These abnormal returns are in the order of 2.4}4.3% as shown in di!erent time periods and in di!erent studies (see Hite and Owers, 1983; Miles and Rosenfeld, 1983; Schipper and Smith, 1983; Rosenfeld, 1984) . More recently, Cusatis et al. (1993) show that even the long-term performance of "rms involved in spin-o!s is abnormally positive. Academic researchers have provided various reasons to explain these gains. Foremost among the reasons are improvement in focus and the elimination of negative synergies, transfer of wealth from bondholders to shareholders, tax and regulatory advantages, and recontracting bene"ts after the spin-o!.
Practitioners and the popular press, on the other hand, usually propose an information-related motivation for spin-o!s. For instance, CEOs of most "rms involved in spin-o!s claim that the spin-o! improves the "rm's market value because investors are able to perceive value more clearly after the spin-o!. They argue that as separate entities the consequence of a temporary decline in the performance of one entity does not spill over and adversely a!ect the other. For example, Robert Allen, the chairman of AT&T, while discussing the motivation behind their recent spin-o! decision claimed that &&the market value of AT&T was being buried. Investors couldn't understand the strategy of the combined "rm''. After the spin-o! AT&T would be the biggest pure play in telecommunications. &&Investors will clearly understand it now'' (quoted in Keller, 1995) .
If the elimination of negative synergies, improvements in focus, or tax and regulatory considerations are the only motives behind the separation of a parent from its subsidiary then any other type of divestiture should work just as well as a spin-o!. These motives explain divestitures in general, but do not o!er speci"c insights into the comparative advantage of divesting through a spin-o!. Spino!s di!er from other modes of divestitures such as asset sales and equity carve-outs because there is no cash in#ow to the "rm. If the "rm is currently undervalued, as the CEOs and practitioners contend, then a spin-o! is an especially appropriate mode of separation because undervaluation does not a!ect the cash in#ows to the "rm since the subsidiary is not being sold. If the separation of an undervalued "rm into individually operated units, with separately traded shares, improves the accuracy of information processing about the individual divisions of the "rm, then the sum of the separated parts may be greater than the market value of the combined "rm. Such an improvement in market valuation will arise if the divisions are better able to convey information about their individual operating e$ciency and future prospects when they are separate entities than when they are a combined unit.
In this paper we empirically analyze the information hypothesis that a spin-o! enhances value because it mitigates the information asymmetry in the market about the pro"tability and operating e$ciency of the di!erent divisions of the "rm. Consistent with the premise of the information hypothesis we "nd that "rms that engage in spin-o!s have higher levels of information asymmetry about their value than their industry-and size-matched counterparts. In particular, for "rms that engage in spin-o!s, the analysts' earnings forecast errors, the dispersion in analysts' forecasts, and three other measures of information asymmetry are signi"cantly higher than those of their control "rms. We also "nd that for "rms that engage in spin-o!s all "ve measures of information asymmetry decrease substantially after the completion of the spin-o!, which is consistent with the view that a spin-o! mitigates information problems.
Using conditional logistic regressions we "nd that "rms with higher levels of information asymmetry and those that are more diversi"ed have a higher likelihood of engaging in spin-o!s than other "rms. Firms with higher growth opportunities and those with less internally generated capital also show a higher propensity to engage in spin-o!s, although spin-o!s themselves generate no new
The following quotations from the Wall Street Journal about two other recent spin-o! proposals also emphasize the information-related reasoning: &&independently traded shares of the engineering unit would produce a higher overall valuation for Raytheon'' (Dennis J. Picard, CEO of Raytheon, quoted in Carton, 1995) , and &&Wall Street was undervaluing the food unit and would give it a juicy premium as a stand alone unit'' (Hwang, 1995). capital for the "rms. This result, combined with our "nding that the frequency of equity issues and the total amount of capital raised increase signi"cantly in the two years following a spin-o!, suggests that "rms mitigate their information problems through a spin-o! before approaching the external capital markets to raise funds.
The regression results indicate that the gains from a spin-o! are larger for "rms with higher levels of information asymmetry about their value. This result obtains even after controlling for the level of negative synergies between divisions, another factor that may motivate a spin-o!. For "rms that spin o! related subsidiaries, i.e., "rms that should have fewer negative synergies, information asymmetry is a more important explanation of the gains from a spin-o!. This is consistent with the theory that, while negative synergies may play a role in explaining spin-o! gains, mitigation of information problems is also an important factor. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the literature and develops the main hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample selection procedure, the sample characteristics, and the measures of information asymmetry used in this study. Section 4 discusses the results of the univariate and regression analyses. Section 5 provides some concluding comments.
Information asymmetry and the spin-o4 decision
Several studies have empirically analyzed the sources of shareholder gains around spin-o!s (see Hite and Owers, 1983; Miles and Rosenfeld, 1983; Schipper and Smith, 1983; Cusatis et al., 1993; Seward and Walsh, 1996; Daley et al., 1997; Desai and Jain, 1999) . The potential sources of gains from spin-o!s analyzed in these studies may be classi"ed as follows: (i) transfer of wealth from bondholders to shareholders, (ii) tax and regulatory advantages, (iii) restructuring of incentive contracts, and (iv) improved focus and elimination of negative synergies. Among these explanations, the improved focus and elimination of negative synergies hypothesis has received broad empirical support.
The transfer of wealth hypothesis argues that during a spin-o! the assets and liabilities are restructured in a manner that involves a transfer of wealth from the bondholders and other stakeholders to the shareholders of the "rm. A recent example of wealth transfer through a spin-o! is in Parrino (1997) . In a case study of the Marriott spin-o! he shows that the restructuring not only reduced the collateral on Marriott's existing debt, but also reduced the bondholder claims on cash #ows from the business. This resulted in a large increase in the stock price and an associated decrease in the value of the "rm's debt. Hite and Owers (1983) and Schipper and Smith (1983) , however, "nd little evidence of wealth transfers on average in a large sample of spin-o!s. Both studies "nd that the announcement period bond returns are not signi"cantly di!erent from zero.
Schipper and Smith "nd that there is a decline in bond ratings after the spin-o! in only two of the 93 cases that they analyze. Schipper and Smith (1983) also examine the tax and regulatory motives for spin-o!s. They argue that a regulated "rm may be able to spin-o! a subsidiary in a fashion that results in either the parent or the subsidiary escaping the external constraint of regulation. A "rm may also be able to spin-o! an overseas subsidiary to avoid paying U.S. taxes on the income from that division. Although the bene"ts to individual "rms from such motivations do exist, on average the authors do not "nd any evidence to support these hypotheses. Aron (1991) argues that for a large, multi-product "rm, the share price is a very noisy signal of any one divisional manager's productivity. A separation through a spin-o! is therefore optimal since managerial compensation that is based on the productivity and e$ciency of individual divisions improves managers' incentives. More generally, the recontracting e!ectiveness hypothesis argues that the gains from spin-o!s arise from unique contracts after the restructuring that improve the incentives of the di!erent stakeholders of the "rm. In a study of 78 spin-o!s, Seward and Walsh (1996) "nd that after the spin-o! both the boards of directors and the compensation committees are comprised of a majority of outside directors, suggesting the implementation of e$cient internal governance and control mechanisms. They also "nd that the compensation of the CEO of the spun-o! subsidiary is typically performancecontingent. However, they "nd that the gains around spin-o!s are not statistically related to these improvements in contracting e$ciency. Hite and Owers (1983) , Schipper and Smith (1983) , Daley et al. (1997) , and Desai and Jain (1999) contend that gains from spin-o!s could arise from improvement in the "rm's focus and the elimination of negative synergies between the parent and the subsidiary. Daley, Mehrotra, and Sivakumar, and Desai and Jain document a signi"cant improvement in operating performance in the year after the event for spin-o!s that separate divisions that operate in di!erent industries. Desai and Jain use two other methods to identify focus improving spin-o!s, and report that the improved operating and "nancial performance following spin-o!s is robust to the classi"cation scheme. Hite and Owers classify "rms based on the reasons given by the "rms for the spin-o! and "nd that the subsample where the motivation was improvement in focus exhibits the largest abnormal returns in the period from 50 days prior to the announcement to the completion date of the spin-o!. Indirect evidence for the focus improvement motive is also provided by Allen et al. (1995) who examine whether the abnormal returns around spin-o!s is a consequence of the correction of a prior mistake. They show that when a spin-o! is preceded by the Miller (1995) argues that gains from spin-o!s that separate dissimilar units are consistent with an improvement in focus as well as a clientele e!ect. acquisition of the division the positive abnormal returns around the spin-o! represent the re-creation of value that was destroyed at the time of the earlier acquisition.
The extant empirical evidence therefore indicates that the bene"ts in a spin-o! arise predominantly from the separation of diverse units, which improves focus and eliminates negative synergies between divisions. Cusatis et al. (1993) note signi"cant long-term abnormal returns following spin-o!s, but "nd that these returns are con"ned to the subsample of "rms that are acquired within a threeyear period after the spin-o!. They conclude that spin-o!s facilitate takeovers by isolating speci"c divisions, which increases their value to the bidders. However, this increase in value may arise from two distinct sources. It may be due to the elimination of negative synergies between the parent and the subsidiary, in which case a spin-o! is valuable because it creates a pure play that is more attractive to the bidder. An alternative explanation is that, since the two entities are separate after a spin-o!, the bidder is able to value the separate entities better and thus the standard adverse selection problem that arises under information asymmetry is mitigated. Nanda and Narayanan (1997) formally develop this information related argument for divestitures through a model of asymmetric information about "rm value between the managers of the "rm and the market. They assume that the market can observe the aggregate cash #ows of the "rm but not the individual divisional cash #ows, which results in misvaluation of the "rm's securities. They develop an equilibrium in which an undervalued "rm that requires external capital to "nance growth opportunities will resort to raising capital either through a divestiture or after a divestiture, and an overvalued "rm will resort to an equity issue without separating its divisions. In the context of spin-o!s, since the divestiture does not generate cash in#ows to the "rm, undervalued "rms requiring capital would "rst engage in a spin-o! to attain fair market value for their shares and then issue equity to raise capital.
A spin-o! is followed by a detailed disclosure of all individual pro"t and cost information of the separated divisions in 8K and 10K statements. After the spin-o! the shares trade separately and are tracked by di!erent analysts. These changes obviate the need for a noisy estimation of important division-speci"c cost and pro"t information from consolidated "nancial statements. Gilson et al. (1998) report that after spin-o!s there is a signi"cant turnover among analysts who follow the "rms' stocks. They also "nd that there is greater accuracy in analysts' earnings forecasts when there is higher turnover among analysts. Thus, if poor performance by one division has adversely a!ected the value of other more e$cient and pro"table divisions, a spin-o! will eliminate the undervaluation. Such a correction of valuation would be especially important for "rms that in the near future expect to raise external capital to "nance their growth opportunities.
On the other hand, an ordinary disclosure of this information by a combined "rm without separating the divisions will not be credible because the "rm can manipulate shared costs (which are unobservable by the market) across divisions to maximize the proceeds from the new security issue. A spin-o!, however, formally separates the operations and assets of the divisions; no manipulation of costs is possible because there are no shared costs. Hence, the information hypothesis argues that a spin-o! enhances value because separating the divisions of a "rm into individually operated and traded entities mitigates the information asymmetry in the market about the di!erent divisions' pro"tability and operating e$ciency. Thus, even if there are no negative synergies between divisions, information asymmetry is itself a su$cient motivation for corporations to engage in spin-o!s.
There are several testable implications of the information hypothesis. First, "rms that engage in spin-o!s should have higher levels of information asymmetry about their value compared to other "rms. Second, the abnormal returns at the spin-o! announcement should be positive, since in equilibrium only undervalued "rms engage in spin-o!s (Nanda and Narayanan, 1997) . Third, if information asymmetry results in undervaluation, then the wealth gains from a spin-o! should be positively related to the level of information asymmetry about the "rm. Furthermore, by separating the divisions through a spin-o!, the individual divisions' operating costs and e$ciency are revealed to the market. Thus, the information hypothesis not only predicts a positive share price reaction, but also predicts that the level of information asymmetry will decrease for these "rms after the completion of the spin-o!. Since "rms with di!erent divisions operating within the same industry are likely to have few negative synergies between divisions (Schipper and Smith, 1983; Berger and Ofek, 1995) , when these "rms undertake a spin-o! we expect that information asymmetry is a more important explanation of the shareholder gains from the spin-o!.
Since the information hypothesis argues that market value is more transparent after a spin-o!, a spin-o! may be motivated by a need to raise external capital after the separation. We therefore expect "rms that have more growth options in their investment opportunity set but are liquidity constrained to engage in a spin-o!. The consequent reduction in information asymmetry lowers the "nancing costs for the "rm. Finally, evidence that a spin-o! is followed by either the parent or the subsidiary raising more external capital than before and more external capital than otherwise similar "rms will be consistent with the information hypothesis.
For evidence of manipulation in transfer pricing and management fees, see Emmanuel and Mehafdi (1994) . See also section 7 of Aron (1991) .
Data

Data selection
We identify the sample of "rms that undertake spin-o!s from the following sources: (i) stock distributions by "rms trading on the NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq, that the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) identi"es as spin-o!s, (ii) "rms in the National Automated Accounting Research System whose annual reports disclose spin-o!s, and (iii) news wires and articles on Lexis-Nexis and the Wall Street Journal that report spin-o! transactions by "rms. The stock distributions that CRSP identi"es as spin-o!s sometimes include new issues of another class of shares by a "rm. The other sources sometimes include stock sales such as equity carve-outs and distributions of common stock in other publicly traded "rms that are not subsidiaries of the "rm. Since these transactions do not constitute spin-o!s we delete them from the sample. We discard return of capital distributions since they are predominantly distributions of income by Real Estate Investment Trusts and do not represent separation of divisions of a "rm. Our sample also excludes non-voluntary spin-o!s such as those forced through anti-trust regulation. This results in an initial sample of 212 spin-o!s.
Finally, to remain in the sample, "rms must have earnings forecast data reported on the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES). The IBES coverage requirement arises because, in testing the information hypothesis, we use the errors in analysts' earnings forecasts (both adjusted and unadjusted for earnings volatility) and the standard deviation of these forecasts available through IBES as three of "ve measures of information asymmetry. This procedure yields a "nal sample of 118 voluntary corporate spin-o!s that were completed between January 1979 and December 1993. The reduction in sample size by 94 "rms due to the IBES coverage requirement is large in absolute and relative terms. In Section 4.2, for these 94 "rms, we present some "nancial information and the measures of information asymmetry that do not require earnings forecast data.
The subsidiaries divested in the spin-o! transactions are identi"ed by crosschecking the transactions with the details in Moody's Dividend Records, and in news wires and Wall Street Journal articles on Lexis-Nexis. The declaration date, ex-date, record date, and pay date are identi"ed from CRSP and Moody's Dividend Record. We obtain the tax status of the spin-o!s from CRSP. Of the 118 spin-o!s, 96 are by "rms listed on the NYSE, 7 are by "rms on the Amex, and 15 are by "rms on Nasdaq. Table 1 shows the frequency of spin-o!s in each of the sample years along with their exchange listings. CRSP identi"es a declaration date for these transactions as the date on which the "rm makes a formal declaration of the spin-o!, or the date on which the shareholders approve the spin-o!. We search the Lexis-Nexis database and Wall Street Journal index at least two years before the CRSP-identi"ed declaration date for the earliest press announcement of the spin-o!. When an announcement is encountered, we search back another year from this date to con"rm that there are no earlier announcements.
To control for "rm-speci"c characteristics such as size and industry classi"cation in our empirical tests, we select a control "rm for each parent "rm in the spin-o! sample. For each sample "rm, we "nd a control "rm by searching through the list of all "rms for which data is available on the CRSP Daily Master "le, on the Compustat tapes, and on the IBES tapes. The control "rms are restricted to exclude all the parents and subsidiaries in the spin-o! sample. From this list of possible controls we choose the "rm in the same four-digit SIC code as the sample "rm that is closest in market value. Year-end market values for the sample "rms and the control "rms are computed in the year preceding the spin-o! announcement year. The market value of a "rm is de"ned as total assets of the "rm minus the book value of its equity plus the market value of its equity. To obtain a reasonable trade-o! between industry and size matching, we impose the condition that the market value of the control "rm be within 25% of the market value of the sample "rm within the four-digit SIC code. If no such match exists, we search for a match at the three-digit SIC level, then at the two-digit level, and "nally at the one-digit level. In our sample 70 "rms have control "rms matched at the four-digit level, 14 "rms at the three-digit level, 31 "rms at the two-digit level, and 3 "rms at the one-digit level.
Data characteristics
We analyze the industry a$liations of the 118 parent "rms that engaged in a spin-o! and the 126 subsidiaries that were spun-o!, and "nd that the distribution of the subsidiaries across industries is very similar to that of the parent "rms. The industry a$liations of the parents and the subsidiaries span 52 distinct two-digit SIC codes. For each "rm announcing a spin-o! we obtain the reasons stated by the "rm for the divestiture from proxy statements, annual reports, and WSJ articles about the spin-o!. The motives most often cited are improvement of business focus, improvement of market valuation of the separate entities, and improved access to capital markets. Other motives include basing operational strategy and compensation on division-speci"c characteristics and facilitating a merger.
The average equity capitalization of the combined "rm before the announcement of the spin-o! is $1435 million, as can be seen in Table 2 . To the extent that Table 2 Market capitalization of the parents and subsidiaries in a sample of 118 "rms that completed a spin-o! in the period 1979}1993. Spin-o!s are identi"ed from the CRSP tapes, the National Automated Accounting Research System, and news wires and articles from Lexis-Nexis and the Wall Street Journal. Market capitalization of combined "rm is the product of the total number of shares outstanding and the closing price per share of the "rm measured in the year-end prior to the spin-o! announcement year. It is denominated in millions of dollars. Market capitalization of parent and Market capitalization of subsidiary are measured similarly but in the month of the completion of the spin-o!, and are denominated in millions of dollars. Relative size-before is measured as the ratio of the market capitalization of the subsidiary after the spin-o! to the market capitalization of the combined "rm before the spin-o!. Relative size-after is measured as the ratio of the market capitalization of the subsidiary after the spin-o! to the sum of the market capitalizations of the parent and the subsidiary after the spin-o!. the value gain from a divestiture is related to the fraction of a "rm's operations that is dissociated (Hite and Owers, 1983; Miles and Rosenfeld, 1983) , we also examine the size of the divested unit. The average market capitalization of the spun-o! subsidiaries, measured in the month of the completion of the spin-o!, is $301 million. The mean relative size of the spun-o! divisions, measured relative to the size of the combined "rm before the announcement, is just under 31%. This is comparable to the 29% relative size in Vijh (1994) for his sample of 113 spin-o!s that were completed between 1962 and 1990. This relative size measure, however, may be an in#ated estimate of the true relative size because the size of each subsidiary is computed after the spin-o! and so includes the e!ect of the spin-o! event, while the capitalization of the combined "rm does not re#ect the impact of the event. To improve this proxy for relative size, we compute the relative size after the completion of the spin-o!, measured as the ratio of the capitalization of the subsidiary to the sum of the capitalizations of the parent and subsidiary after the completion of the spin-o!. This relative size measure indicates that on average about 22% of the combined "rm is divested through a spin-o!. Table 3 lists the "nancial characteristics of the sample and control "rms. The average book value of total assets of the sample "rms is $2367 million, as Table 3 Descriptive statistics of the "nancial variables for a sample of 118 "rms that completed a spin-o! in the period 1979}1993 and for a sample of 118 size-and industry-matched control "rms that did not engage in a spin-o!. Spin-o!s are identi"ed from the CRSP tapes, the National Automated Accounting Research System, and news wires and articles from Lexis-Nexis and the Wall Street Journal. Total assets is obtained from Compustat and is denominated in billions of dollars. Cash#ow from operations is cash#ow generated from all operating activities and is measured as a ratio relative to the total assets of the "rm. Operating income is sales minus cost of goods sold and other expenses, before depreciation and amortization, and is measured as a ratio relative to the total assets of the "rm. Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of (book value of assets!book value of equity#market value of equity) to the book value of assets. Debt ratio is measured as the ratio of short-term plus long-term debt to the total assets of the "rm. Unrelated entropy is an index of unrelated diversi"cation of the "rm in its operations. For each "rm, unrelated entropy is the weighted average of the percentage sales of the various distinct two-digit SIC industry groups within that "rm. All variables are measured at year-end of the year prior to the spin-o! announcement year. compared to $2158 million for the control "rms. The sample "rms generate less internal cash #ow, about 10.5% of total assets, compared to nearly 14% for the control "rms. The typical "rm that engages in a spin-o! has a total debt ratio of 29% while its size-and industry-adjusted control is more conservatively "nanced with a debt ratio of 24%. Perhaps the most striking di!erence between the "rms that undertake spin-o!s and those that do not is in their level of diversi"cation in operations. Following Palepu (1985) we measure unrelated diversi"cation using the unrelated entropy index. For each "rm, unrelated entropy is the weighted average of the percentage sales of the various distinct two-digit SIC industry groups within that "rm. The sample "rms are more diversi"ed with a mean unrelated entropy of 0.572 compared to the control "rms which have a mean unrelated entropy of 0.310. This di!erence is more pronounced in the medians.
Measures of information asymmetry
We use "ve di!erent measures of information asymmetry in the empirical analysis. The "rst is the forecast error in earnings measured before the announcement of the spin-o!. Analysts' earnings forecasts are obtained from IBES, which reports a monthly mean, median, and standard deviation of the forecasts for each "rm based on the analysts' estimates that are submitted that month. For each "rm in the sample (and for its matched control), the "scal year prior to the announcement of the spin-o! serves as the year of observation. The mean monthly earnings forecast for the last month of that "scal year is de"ned as the predicted earnings. Following Christie (1987) , we measure forecast error as the ratio of the absolute di!erence between the forecast earnings and the actual earnings per share to the price per share at the beginning of the month. Firms with larger levels of information asymmetry between the managers and the outside market about their cash #ows and value are expected to have higher forecast errors.
The use of errors in analysts' forecasts of earnings as a measure of information asymmetry surrounding a "rm is especially appropriate given the evidence in Elton et al. (1984) . They undertake a detailed analysis of the forecast errors in the earnings of a wide cross-section of "rms. They examine the size, pattern, and source of these errors by partitioning them into errors derived from mispredicting economy-wide factors, industry-wide factors, and "rm-speci"c factors. They show that the errors decrease as the predictions get closer to the end of the "scal year and "nd that nearly 84% of the forecast error in the "nal month can be Desai and Jain (1999) also use a measure similar to the unrelated entropy index. Their Her"ndahl index measure is constructed using the sales of di!erent divisions in a "rm but does not distinguish between divisions operating in di!erent two-digit SIC industry groups within a "rm.
attributed to misestimation of "rm-speci"c factors rather than to misestimation of economy or industry factors. This evidence suggests that analysts' forecast errors are a particularly appropriate proxy for the level of information asymmetry about a "rm.
The second measure of information asymmetry is the standard deviation of forecasts, which is measured as the standard deviation of all earnings forecasts made in the last month of the "scal year preceding the spin-o! announcement year. This variable represents the dispersion among analysts about a consensus estimate of the forecast. Since disagreement among analysts is an indication of the lack of available information about the "rm, we use this standard deviation as another metric of the level of information asymmetry about the "rm.
One criticism of the use of forecast errors as a measure of information asymmetry is that some "rms may have higher forecast errors because they have more volatile earnings and not because they have higher levels of information asymmetry. Thus, the forecast errors may be correlated with the riskiness of the "rm. To control for the correlation between forecast errors and earnings volatility, we compute a third measure of information asymmetry, the normalized forecast error, which is de"ned as the ratio of the forecast error in earnings to the earnings volatility of the "rm. Earnings volatility is the standard deviation of the "rm's detrended quarterly earnings in the "ve-year period before the announcement of the spin-o!.
Following Dierkens (1991) , we use the volatility in abnormal returns around earnings announcements as the fourth measure of information asymmetry about each "rm. This announcement reaction variable is measured as the standard deviation of the three-day abnormal returns around the announcement of quarterly earnings, over all the quarterly earnings announcements during the "ve years preceding the announcement of the spin-o!. The quarterly earnings announcement dates are obtained from Compustat. For "rm-quarters with missing earnings announcement dates, we obtain the dates from the Wall Street Journal Index. We use the CRSP value-weighted index to compute the marketadjusted abnormal returns around the announcement dates. A strong positive or negative reaction by the market around an information-revealing event such as an earnings announcement suggests that information asymmetry is high for these "rms. As in Dierkens (1991) , the standard deviation of the abnormal Fried and Givoly (1982) and O'Brien (1988) show that analysts are overly optimistic at the beginning of the "scal year and therefore tend to revise their forecasts downward as the year progresses. Thus, forecast errors may include a component due to this &optimism bias' that may confound the use of this measure as a proxy for information asymmetry. This is not a problem in our study for two reasons: for all "rms, the errors are computed in a common month, the last month of the "scal year, thereby standardizing the impact of this bias, and forecasts in the last month of the "scal year have been shown (O'Brien, 1988) to be the most accurate. returns around earnings announcements, which measures the dispersion in the market reaction, is used as a metric of information asymmetry.
Finally, following Bhagat et al. (1985) , Blackwell et al. (1990) , and Krishnaswami et al. (1999) , we use the residual volatility in daily stock returns as the "fth proxy for information asymmetry. Information asymmetry about a "rm is high when managers have a relatively large amount of value-relevant, "rm-speci"c information that is not shared by the market. Investors bear some "rm-speci"c uncertainty until this information is revealed to the market. If the investors and the "rm's managers are equally well-informed about the economy-wide factors in#uencing the "rm's value, then the residual volatility in the "rm's stock returns captures the information asymmetry between the investors and the managers about "rm-speci"c information. The residual standard deviation is the dispersion in the market-adjusted daily stock returns in the year preceding the announcement of the spin-o!. This residual standard deviation variable captures the "rm-speci"c uncertainty that remains after removing from the total uncertainty the uncertainty that is common to the "rm's insiders and the market. We expect "rms with higher information asymmetry about their cash #ows and value to have higher residual volatility in their stock returns.
Empirical results
Abnormal returns
Prior studies "nd positive abnormal returns around the announcement of spin-o!s. We con"rm these returns by employing the event-study methodology used by Dodd and Warner (1983) . We estimate a market model over a 155-day period ending 45 days before the announcement of the spin-o!. The CRSP value-weighted index is used as a proxy for the market portfolio. Table 4 summarizes the abnormal returns over di!erent time intervals ar ound the announcement date for the sample of "rms that engaged in spin-o!s. We obtain a signi"cant two-day cumulative abnormal return of 3.15% in the window (!1, 0), which is consistent with the "ndings of earlier studies on spin-o!s. Signi"cant abnormal returns of 1.80% and 3.28% are also found on day 0 and in the window (!1,#1), respectively.
Univariate tests
We compare the levels of information asymmetry of the sample "rms with those of their size-and industry-matched control "rms. If "rms that engage in Admittedly, this variable may be an overestimate of the true measure of information asymmetry, since it also contains the impact of information that was previously unavailable to both the investors and the managers. Table 4 Cumulative abnormal returns over selected intervals for a sample of 118 "rms that completed a spin-o! during the period 1979}1993. Spin-o!s are identi"ed from the CRSP tapes, the National Automated Accounting Research System, and news wires and articles from Lexis-Nexis and the Wall Street Journal. Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model parameters estimated over a 155-day period ending 45 days before the announcement date. The CRSP value-weighted index is used in the market model to compute betas. The abnormal returns are cumulated in the intervals. The percentage positive is the ratio of the number of "rms with positive abnormal returns to the total number of "rms. The generalized sign test is used to test the signi"cance of the percentage of "rms with positive abnormal returns.
Interval
Cumulative abnormal returns for sample spin-o!s are subject to greater information dissemination problems, we should observe higher levels of information asymmetry for the sample "rms relative to the control "rms before the spin-o!. Panel A of Table 5 summarizes the di!erence in the information asymmetry variables between the sample and control "rms before the announcement of the spin-o!. The results are consistent with the information hypothesis. The average forecast error for the sample "rms is 0.0433, which is more than three times that of the controls. The Wilcoxon's signed rank test of the di!erence in the means across the sample and control "rms and the Median Scores test for the di!erence in the medians indicate that the forecast errors of the two groups are signi"cantly di!erent from each other at the 1% signi"cance level. These results also persist through the other four measures of information asymmetry. If the separation of a "rm into individually operated units with separately traded shares improves the accuracy of information processing about the individual divisions of the "rm, then the level of information asymmetry should decrease after the completion of the spin-o!. To examine this we compute the information asymmetry variables after the completion of the spin-o!. The after-event forecast error is de"ned as the ratio of the absolute value of the di!erence between the actual earnings and the forecast earnings to the price per Table 5 Summary statistics of the information asymmetry variables for a sample of 118 "rms that completed a spin-o! in the period 1979}1993 and for a sample of 118 size-and industry-matched control "rms that did not engage in a spin-o!. Spin-o!s are identi"ed from the CRSP tapes, the National Automated Accounting Research System, and news wires and articles from Lexis-Nexis and the Wall Street Journal. The forecast errors are de"ned as the ratio of the absolute value of the di!erence between the actual earnings and the forecast earnings to the price per share at the beginning of the month. The before-event forecast errors are measured in the last month of the "scal year before the announcement of the spin-o!. The after-event forecast errors are measured in the last month of the "rst "scal year after the completion of the spin-o!. The standard deviation of forecasts measures the dispersion in the analysts' earnings forecasts in the month in which the forecast errors are computed. The before-event normalized forecast errors are measured as the ratio of the beforeevent forecast errors to the standard deviation of the detrended quarterly earnings in the "ve years before the announcement of the spin-o!. The after-event normalized forecast errors are measured as the ratio of the after-event forecast errors to the standard deviation of the detrended quarterly earnings in the two years after the completion of the spin-o!. The before-event announcement reaction variable is the standard deviation of the three-day cumulative abnormal returns around the announcements of quarterly earnings in the "ve year period before the announcement of the spin-o!. The after-event announcement reaction variable is the standard deviation of the three-day cumulative abnormal returns around the announcements of quarterly earnings in the two year period after the completion of the spin-o!. The before-event residual standard deviation is the dispersion in the market-adjusted daily stock returns in the year preceding the spin-o! announcement. The after-event residual standard deviation is the dispersion in the market-adjusted daily stock returns in the year after the spin-o! completion. The results of the nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank test for the di!erence in the means and the Median Scores test for the di!erence in the medians are speci"ed in the panels. Signi"cant at 1%. Signi"cant at 5%. Signi"cant at 10%.
share at the beginning of the month, and is measured in the last month of the "rst "scal year after the completion of the spin-o!. The after-event standard deviation of forecasts is also measured in the same month as the after-event forecast errors. The after-event normalized forecast error is the after-event forecast error normalized by the standard deviation of the detrended quarterly earnings in the two years after the spin-o! completion. The after-event announcement reaction variable measures the standard deviation of the three-day abnormal returns around the announcements of quarterly earnings in the two year period after the completion of the spin-o!. Finally, we measure the after-event residual standard deviation as the dispersion in the market-adjusted daily stock returns in the year after the completion of the spin-o!. The summary statistics of the information asymmetry variables measured before and after the spin-o! are reported in Panel B of Table 5 . The evidence indicates that the forecast errors decrease signi"cantly (by over 78%) after the event. The mean and median di!erence between the before-event forecast errors and the after-event forecast errors are signi"cantly di!erent from zero at the 1% level, concurring with our expectations. The other four measures of information asymmetry also signi"cantly decrease after the spin-o!.
If information asymmetry results in undervaluation of the "rm, and if spino!s mitigate information asymmetry, then "rms with higher levels of information asymmetry should exhibit higher abnormal returns upon the announcement of spin-o!s. To examine this implication, we sort the sample "rms into quartiles (highest to lowest) based on their level of information asymmetry. We then examine the quartiles to see whether the abnormal returns are signi"cantly higher in the top quartile relative to the bottom quartile. As shown in Table 6 , the average abnormal returns are signi"cantly higher for the group of "rms in the top quartile. For instance, when the quartiles are based on the forecast error variable, the top quartile mean two-day CAR is 4.11%, while it is 2.28% in the bottom quartile. This di!erence is signi"cant at the 5% level. Furthermore, the abnormal returns decrease monotonically from the group with the highest forecast error to the group with the lowest forecast error. Similarly, in the quartile classi"cation based on the standard deviation of the forecasts, the top quartile median CAR is 4.88%, the bottom quartile median CAR is 0.38%, and the di!erence is signi"cant at the 1% level.
We also analyze the "nancial and information asymmetry variables for the 94 "rms (in our original sample of 212) that do not have analysts' forecast data. We "nd that these "rms are smaller in size with similar growth opportunities but with less internally generated cash#ow, and are less diversi"ed than our primary sample of 118 "rms. This evidence suggests that for these "rms information asymmetry is likely to be a more important motive for a spin-o! than improving focus. Consistent with this conjecture, the two measures of information asymmetry that are available for these "rms indicate that the level of information asymmetry is higher for these "rms than for the primary sample of 118 "rms Table 6 Abnormal returns for a sample of 118 "rms that completed a spin-o! in the period 1979}1993, sorted based on the level of information asymmetry. Spin-o!s are identi"ed from the CRSP tapes, the National Automated Accounting Research System, and news wires and articles from Lexis-Nexis and the Wall Street Journal. Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model parameters estimated over a 155-day period ending 45 days before the announcement date. The CRSP valueweighted index is used in the market model to compute betas. The abnormal returns are the cumulative abnormal returns measured over the interval (!1, 0). The forecast errors are de"ned as the ratio of the absolute value of the di!erence between the actual earnings and the forecast earnings to the price per share at the beginning of the month, and are measured in the last month of the "scal year before the announcement of the spin-o!. The standard deviation of the forecasts measure the dispersion in the analysts' earnings forecasts in the month in which the forecast errors are computed. The normalized forecast errors are measured as the ratio of the forecast errors to the standard deviation of the detrended quarterly earnings in the "ve years before the announcement of the spin-o!. The announcement reaction variable is the standard deviation of the three-day cumulative abnormal returns around the announcements of quarterly earnings in the "ve year period before the announcement of the spin-o!. The residual standard deviation is the dispersion in the marketadjusted daily stock returns in the year preceding the spin-o! announcement. The results of the nonparametric Mann-Whitney Rank test for di!erence in the means and the Median Scores test for the di!erence in the medians are speci"ed in the panel. Signi"cant at 1%. Signi"cant at 5%. Signi"cant at 10%.
(and their control "rms). As with the primary sample, we "nd that information asymmetry is positively related to the abnormal returns, and the level of information asymmetry decreases following a spin-o!. We therefore, believe that the reduction in sample size due to the analysts' forecast data requirement does not a!ect our inferences. These results are available from the authors upon request. Schipper and Smith (1983) argue that elimination of negative synergies may be a motive for corporate spin-o!s. Accordingly, they "nd that a signi"cant fraction of their sample of spin-o!s contains "rms for which the separated subsidiary is in a di!erent industry. We examine this theory by classifying the sample into same-industry and cross-industry spin-o!s using a criterion that is similar to the one used by Daley et al. (1997) . We de"ne a cross-industry spin-o! as one in which the parent divests a subsidiary with a two-digit SIC code that is di!erent from the primary two-digit SIC code of the parent. Consistent with the elimination of negative synergies hypothesis, Panel A of Table 7 reports that the mean announcement period abnormal return is 3.59% for the subsample of cross-industry spin-o!s, while it is only 1.86% for the subsample of sameindustry spin-o!s. This di!erence is signi"cant at the 5% level. This result is similar to the "nding in Daley et al. (1997) , who further report that the long-term operating and "nancial performance is better for the cross-industry group than for the same-industry group.
Stock analysts typically have industry preferences and tend to track "rms in one or a few speci"c industries. When these analysts encounter "rms with divisions in di!erent industries, their valuation of the unfamiliar divisions is likely to be less accurate, leading to higher forecast errors for such "rms. This reasoning is emphasized in a Business Week article discussing the Westinghouse spin-o! in which the author argues that &&Wall Street couldn't "gure out how to value a $9.5 billion company with one foot in a TV studio and the other in a nuclear-waste dump'' (see Baker, 1996) . Also, if analysts evaluate a "rm based predominantly on its primary industry a$liation, then their earnings forecasts of "rms with multiple lines of business will contain larger errors. In a random sample of "rms, one therefore expects higher forecast errors for "rms that operate in more than one industry. The same need not be true, however, for the sample of "rms that engage in spin-o!s, because, if the adverse e!ect of information asymmetry were an important motive for spin-o!s, we would expect even same-industry spin-o!s to have high levels of information asymmetry. Evidence that there is no signi"cant di!erence in the information asymmetry levels between the sub-samples of same and cross-industry spin-o!s will therefore be consistent with the information hypothesis. Evidence that there is no correlation between the variables that measure information asymmetry and the variables that measure negative synergies across divisions will indicate that our measures of information asymmetry are not proxying for negative synergies. Table 7 Information asymmetry and abnormal returns for the sub-samples of same-industry and cross-industry spin-o!s in a sample of 118 "rms that completed a spin-o! in the period 1979}1993. Spin-o!s are identi"ed from the CRSP tapes, the National Automated Accounting Research System, and news wires and articles from Lexis-Nexis and the Wall Street Journal. Spin-o!s where the parent's primary two-digit SIC code di!ers from the subsidiary's two-digit SIC code are classi"ed as cross-industry spin-o!s. Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model parameters estimated over a 155-day period ending 45 days before the announcement date. The CRSP value-weighted index is used in the market model to compute betas. The abnormal returns are the cumulative abnormal returns measured over the interval (!1, 0). The forecast errors are de"ned as the ratio of the absolute value of the di!erence between the actual earnings and the forecast earnings to the price per share at the beginning of the month, and are measured in the last month of the "scal Correlations across the information asymmetry and negative synergy variables in a sample of 118 "rms that completed a spin-o! in the period 1979}1993.
The cross-industry SIC dummy is 1 if the parent's primary two-digit SIC code di!ers from the subsidiary's two-digit SIC code and 0 otherwise. Unrelated entropy is an index of unrelated diversi"cation of the "rm in its operations. For each "rm, unrelated entropy is the weighted average of the percentage sales of the various distinct two-digit SIC industry groups within that "rm. The Spearman rank correlations of the variables are speci"ed in the panel. Signi"cant at 1%. Signi"cant at 5%. Signi"cant at 10%.
The results in Panel B of Table 7 conform to the implications of the information hypothesis. They indicate that the di!erence in the mean and median level of information asymmetry between cross-industry and same-industry spin-o!s is not statistically signi"cant. The mean forecast error for the cross-industry subsample is 0.040, as compared to 0.052 for the same-industry subsample, but this di!erence is not statistically signi"cant. The evidence is similar across the other measures of information asymmetry.
Panel C of Table 7 presents the Spearman correlation coe$cients for the "ve measures of information asymmetry and the two measures of negative synergies. Each of the pairwise correlations among the "ve information asymmetry variables is positive and statistically signi"cant. With the exception of the standard deviation of forecasts variable, the information asymmetry variables have pairwise correlations that are signi"cantly positive at the 1% level. The standard deviation of forecasts is correlated with the forecast error and the normalized forecast error variables at the 5% level of signi"cance, and with the announcement reaction and residual standard deviation variables at the 10% level. The two negative synergy variables, the cross-industry SIC dummy and the unrelated entropy index, are signi"cantly correlated at the 1% level with a coe$cient of 0.416. Finally, none of the "ve information asymmetry variables is signi"-cantly correlated with either of the two measures of negative synergies. The information asymmetry variables therefore do not seem to be proxying for negative synergies across divisions of a "rm.
To identify the incremental impact of information asymmetry on shareholder gains around spin-o!s, we also examine other factors that may be used as controls in the regression analysis. Cusatis et al. (1993) "nd that the post-event abnormal long-term performance of spin-o!s is con"ned to the subsample of "rms that were acquired after the spin-o!. In this context, we use the motives stated in proxy statements and news articles to classify the sample of spin-o!s into two groups, one containing "rms that state the facilitation of a merger or acquisition as a motive, and the other containing the remaining "rms. We expect higher abnormal returns for the subsample with a merger motive. The results in Panel A of Table 8 , however, indicate that the average abnormal returns for the subsample with a merger motive is 4.09% compared to a statistically indistinguishable 3.09% for the other subsample.
Regulation may be another motive for "rms to engage in spin-o!s. Regulated subsidiaries can bring the parent under their regulatory umbrella, which restrains the parent in its operations. The separation of a regulated subsidiary (parent) from the parent (subsidiary) through a spin-o! eliminates this external constraint and may be a source of the gains generated around spin-o! announcements. We classify sample "rms as potentially having a regulation motive if either the parent or the subsidiary, but not both, is in an unregulated industry based on four-digit SIC codes. Panel B of Table 8 reveals no signi"cant di!erence in the abnormal returns of the subsamples of "rms with and without Table 8 Summary of abnormal returns for a sample of 118 "rms that completed a spin-o! in the period 1979}1993, sorted based on di!erent characteristics of the sample "rms. Spin-o!s are identi"ed from the CRSP tapes, the National Automated Accounting Research System, and news wires and articles from Lexis-Nexis and the Wall Street Journal. The motives for each spin-o! are obtained from proxy statements and from Wall Street Journal articles. A merger motive is said to exist if the "rm states that the spin-o! is intended to facilitate the merger or acquisition of either the parent or the subsidiary with another "rm. A regulation motive is said to exist if either the parent or the subsidiary, but not both, is in an unregulated industry after the spin-o!. Taxable spin-o!s are identi"ed from their distribution codes on CRSP. Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model parameters estimated over a 155-day period ending 45 days before the announcement date. The CRSP value-weighted index is used in the market model to compute betas. The abnormal returns are the cumulative abnormal returns measured over the interval (!1, 0) . N represents the number of observations in each category. The results of the nonparametric Mann}Whitney Rank test for di!erence in the means and the Median Scores test for the di!erence in the medians are speci"ed in the panels. Signi"cant at 1%. Signi"cant at 5%. Signi"cant at 10%. a regulation motive. Thus, consistent with the results in Schipper and Smith (1983) , regulation does not appear to be a signi"cant motive for spin-o!s. Finally, we also examine whether the tax status of a spin-o! explains a portion of the announcement period gains. We "nd that spin-o!s ruled to be taxable distributions by the IRS earn two-day abnormal returns of 1.21%, while the nontaxable group earns 3.43% (see Panel C of Table 8 ), consistent with the expectation that taxation imposes a penalty on shareholders' gains. This di!erence is statistically signi"cant at the 1% level. In Table 9 we present evidence on capital-raising activities by the sample and control "rms for up to three years before and three years after the completion of a spin-o!. In Panel A we report the frequency of equity issues by the "rms in each year. The equity issues are identi"ed from the Security Data Corporation's Global "nancings database. We "nd that in each of the three years before a spin-o! the frequency of equity issuance for the sample "rms is statistically indistinguishable from that of their size-and industry-matched control "rms. In Table 9 Capital raising activity in a sample of 118 "rms that completed a spin-o! in the period 1979}1993 and in a sample of 118 size-and industry-matched control "rms that did not engage in a spin-o!. Spin-o!s are identi"ed from the CRSP tapes, the National Automated Accounting Research System, and news wires and articles from Lexis-Nexis and the Wall Street Journal. Years !1, !2, and !3 are measured relative to the spin-o! announcement year, while Years #1, #2, and #3 are measured relative to the spin-o! completion year. For each "rm, the frequency of equity issues is obtained from the Security Data Corporation's Global Financings database. Equity issues in the years #1, #2, and #3 include issues by the parent "rms and their separated subsidiaries. A one-tailed proportions test is used to test the statistical signi"cance of the increase in frequency of equity issues following spin-o!s compared to the frequency of equity issues before the announcement, and compared to the frequency of equity issues in the control sample. The mean [median] dollar amounts of equity and debt raised in each year by the sample and control "rms are obtained from Compustat and are speci"ed in millions of dollars. In the years following the completion of the spin-o!, the equity and debt amounts reported include capital raised by the parent "rms and their separated subsidiaries. The results of the nonparametric Mann}Whitney Rank test for di!erence in the mean equity and debt amounts between the relevant groups and the results of the Median Scores test for the di!erence in the median equity and debt amounts between the relevant groups are speci"ed in the panel. Signi"cant at 1%. Signi"cant at 5%. Signi"cant at 10%.
Panel A: Frequency of equity issues by the sample and control xrms
the "rst two years following spin-o!s, however, the "rms that engage in spin-o!s issue equity more frequently than the control "rms. These di!erences are statistically signi"cant (using the proportions test) at the 10% level. We "nd that among "rms that engage in spin-o!s the frequency of equity issuance increases following a spin-o!. For the sample "rms, in the two years after a spin-o!, we "nd a total of 30 equity issues, compared to only 20 in the two years before the spin-o!. This di!erence is signi"cant at the 10% level. In Panel B of Table 9 we report the dollar amounts of equity and debt raised by the sample and control "rms. Firms that divest through spin-o!s raise more capital following spin-o!s than their size-and industry-matched control "rms. For instance, in the second year following the spin-o!, "rms that engage in spin-o!s raise on average about $7 million more in equity and about $247 million more in debt than control "rms. These di!erences are statistically signi"cant at least at the 10% level. Perhaps more importantly, "rms that engage in spin-o!s raise more capital following a spin-o! than before. In the two years after a spin-o!, the mean equity (debt) raised is about $25 million ($236 million) higher than the mean equity (debt) raised in the two years before the spin-o!. The di!erence in equity (debt) amounts is signi"cant at the 5% (10%) level of signi"cance. These results suggest that "rms that engage in spin-o!s raise more external capital following the spin-o!s. Moreover, in each of the three years before a spin-o! we "nd that sample "rms issue signi"cantly more debt than their size-and industry-matched counterparts. Thus the evidence is consistent with the view that "rms that engage in spin-o!s "nd external equity to be costly before a spin-o!, perhaps due to information problems (Nanda and Narayanan, 1997) . Following a spin-o!, however, the "rms have reduced information problems and an improved share price and issue more equity.
Information asymmetry and the likelihood of a spin-ow
In this section, we use the information asymmetry variables and the unrelated entropy variable in conditional logistic regressions to explain the incidence of spin-o!s. The dependent variable in these regressions is an indicator variable that is 1 for "rms that divest through a spin-o! and 0 for the control "rms. The information hypothesis argues that the likelihood of a spin-o! is increasing in the level of information asymmetry, and the elimination of negative synergies hypothesis argues that the likelihood is increasing in the level of negative synergies across the divisions of a "rm. Furthermore, information asymmetry plays an important role in "rms that are liquidity-constrained and thus forced to depend on external capital (Nanda and Narayanan, 1997) . A hypothesis that emerges from this argument is that high-growth "rms and those with low levels of internally generated cash have a higher likelihood of engaging in a spin-o!. Following Smith and Watts (1992) , for each "rm we use the ratio of the market value of its assets to the book value of its assets as a proxy for the growth options in the "rm's investment opportunity set. Market value is estimated as the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity.
The conditional logistic regression 1 in Table 10 indicates that forecast errors are signi"cantly positively associated with the incidence of spin-o!s, which is consistent with the information hypothesis. The coe$cient of forecast errors is 32.955, and it has a p-value of 0.015. The coe$cient of the unrelated entropy variable is positive and signi"cant (p-value 0.013), indicating that the higher the level of unrelated diversi"cation in operations by a "rm the higher the likelihood that it will divest some of its divisions through a spin-o!. Cash #ow from operations, which is a measure of liquidity, has a signi"cantly negative coe$cient, suggesting that low levels of internally generated cash lead to a higher incidence of spin-o!s. To control for the growth opportunities available to the "rm, we use a high-growth indicator variable, which is set to 1 if the market-to-book ratio of the "rm is higher than the median market-to-book ratio of the set of all sample and control "rms and 0 otherwise. The signi"cantly positive coe$cient of this variable suggests that high-growth "rms show a higher incidence of spin-o!s. These results are consistent with the implications of the Nanda and Narayanan (1997) argument that spin-o!s are a precursor to raising capital.
Regressions 2 through 5 use the other four measures of information asymmetry, while retaining the unrelated entropy, growth, and corporate liquidity variables from regression 1. Consistent with the information hypothesis, the coe$cient of the information asymmetry variables are positive and signi"cant in all regressions. The unrelated entropy variable also has a positive coe$cient that is signi"cant at least at the 5% level in all the regressions.
Finally, the coe$cients of the growth and the liquidity variables are signi"-cant and have the expected signs. The coe$cient of the high-growth dummy variable is signi"cantly positive at the 5% level in all the regressions, while the coe$cient of the cash #ow from operations variable is signi"cantly negative in each regression. This suggests that high-growth "rms and "rms with low levels of internally generated cash divest divisions through spin-o!s, even though spin-o!s themselves generate no new capital for the "rms. The result is consistent with the view that "rms engage in spin-o!s to mitigate information asymmetry in the capital markets before approaching the market for funds. The results are robust to alternative proxies for the internal cash #ow generated by a "rm. In regressions 6 through 10 we replace the cash #ow from operations variable with the "rm's operating income. This variable is the "rm's sales minus costs of goods sold and other expenses, before depreciation and amortization, and is measured relative to the total assets of the "rm. All our results remain unchanged even with this proxy.
Since the logistic regressions suggest that investors in the market may be able to predict the incidence of spin-o!s, a spin-o! may be partially anticipated by the market and the associated wealth e!ects may be impounded in the stock price even before the "rm announces the spin-o!. The returns we observe upon the announcement of a spin-o! may therefore underestimate the total wealth e!ect of a spin-o!. Following the methodology in Eckbo et al. (1990) and Bhagat and Je!eris (1991) , we compute the anticipation-adjusted abnormal returns using the predicted probabilities generated by a logistic regression.
We compute the anticipation-adjusted wealth e!ect of a spin-o! as follows. Let P ,1 be the stock price of a "rm if it does not engage in a spin-o!, and let P 1 be the stock price of the "rm if it engages in a spin-o!. Let 0) (1 be the market's assessment of the probability that the "rm will engage in a spin-o!. If there is partial anticipation of the spin-o! in the market, the stock price of the Table 10 Conditional logistic regressions to explain the incidence of spin-o!s, using a sample of 118 "rms that completed a spin-o! in the period 1979}1993, and a sample of 118 size-and industry-matched control "rms that did not engage in a spin-o!. Spin-o!s are identi"ed from the CRSP tapes, the National Automated Accounting Research System, and news wires and articles from Lexis-Nexis and the Wall Street Journal. The dependent variable is an indicator variable which is 1 for "rms that engaged in a spin-o! and 0 for the control "rms. The forecast errors are measured in the last month of the "scal year before the announcement of the spin-o!. They are de"ned as the ratio of the absolute value of the di!erence between the actual earnings and the forecast earnings to the price per share at the beginning of the month. The forecast standard deviation measures the dispersion in the earnings forecasts in the month in which the forecast errors are computed. The normalized forecast errors are measured as the ratio of the forecast errors to the standard deviation of the detrended quarterly earnings in the "ve years before the announcement of the spin-o!. The announcement reaction variable is the standard deviation of the three-day cumulative abnormal returns around the announcements of quarterly earnings in the "ve year period before the announcement of the spin-o!. The residual standard deviation is the dispersion in the market-adjusted daily stock returns in the year preceding the spin-o! announcement. Unrelated entropy is the weighted average of the percentage sales of the various distinct two-digit SIC industry groups within a "rm. Cash#ow from operations is cash#ow generated from all operating activities and is measured as a ratio relative to the total assets of the "rm.
Operating income is sales minus cost of goods sold and other expenses, before depreciation and amortization, and is measured as a ratio relative to the total assets of the "rm. The growth dummy D is an indicator variable, which is 1 if the "rm is high-growth, and 0 otherwise. A "rm is classi"ed as a high-growth "rm if its Market-to-book ratio is above the median of the set of all sample and control "rms. Signi"cant at 1%.
Signi"cant at 5%. Signi"cant at 10%.
"rm before the spin-o! announcement would be P, where P" P 1 # (1! )P ,1 . Hence, upon the announcement of a spin-o!, the observed return on the "rm's stock is r -"(P 1 !P)/P. However, the true (anticipation-adjusted) wealth e!ect of a spin-o! is r 2 "(P 1 !P ,1 )/P ,1 . Now, using P" P 1 # (1! )P ,1 , the anticipation-adjusted wealth e!ect r 2 of a spin-o! can be rewritten as r 2 "r -/((1! )! r -), where 0) (1 (see Bhagat and Je!eris, 1991) . For each "rm, ris observed at the spin-o! announcement and is estimated using a logistic regression with the variables in model (1) of Table 10 . The mean two-day anticipation-adjusted abnormal return in the interval (!1, 0) for our sample of spin-o!s is 3.71% which is about 18% higher than the corresponding unadjusted abnormal return of 3.15% reported in Table 4 .
Sources of gains in spin-ows
In this section, we con"rm our univariate results that relate information asymmetry and abnormal returns around spin-o!s using regression analysis. We use the two-day anticipation-adjusted abnormal returns in the interval (!1, 0) as the dependent variable in the regressions in Tables 11 and 12 . We use all "ve measures of information asymmetry in the regressions to test the information hypothesis. The information hypothesis predicts a positive relation between the measures of information asymmetry and the anticipation-adjusted abnormal returns. To examine the predictions of the negative synergies hypothesis we use the cross-industry dummy variable, which is 1 for cross-industry spin-o!s and 0 for same-industry spin-o!s. We expect to see a positive relation between this variable and the anticipation-adjusted abnormal returns. We also use the unrelated entropy index as an alternative measure of negative synergies within a "rm. Since unrelated entropy is high for diversi"ed "rms, we expect a positive relation between unrelated entropy and abnormal returns if the spin-o! gains are driven by the elimination of negative synergies.
Other factors in the regressions control for the other theories that have been proposed in the literature. Hite and Owers (1983) and Miles and Rosenfeld (1983) "nd that the announcement period gains are larger when a "rm divests a larger portion of its assets. We use the market value of equity of the divested subsidiary measured relative to the sum of the equity capitalizations of the parent and the subsidiary (computed in the month of the completion of the spin-o!) to control for size related e!ects. An indicator variable distinguishes sample "rms that have stated a merger motive. This merger dummy is set to 1 if the "rm stated that the spin-o! was undertaken to facilitate a merger and is set to 0 otherwise. We expect the coe$cient of this merger dummy to be positive. A regulation dummy variable distinguishes "rms with a regulation motive. For each sample "rm, the regulation dummy is set to 1 if either the "rm or the subsidiary, but not both, is in an unregulated industry and is set to 0 otherwise. If dissociation of an unregulated division from a regulated division provides gains to the shareholders, we expect the coe$cient of the regulation dummy to be signi"cant and positive. Finally, to account for the tax status of a spin-o!, we use a tax dummy, which is 1 if the spin-o! has been ruled as taxable and 0 otherwise. The coe$cient of the tax dummy is expected to be negative since taxation imposes a penalty on shareholders' gains. Table 11 reports the parameter estimates in the di!erent regressions and their heteroskedasticity adjusted t-statistics. All the variables in regression 1 show the expected signs. The coe$cient of the forecast error variable is 14.239 and signi"cant at the 1% level, con"rming the positive relation between abnormal returns and information asymmetry. We also compute the economic impact of the variables. We measure the economic impact of an independent variable as the change in wealth gains from a spin-o! (as a fraction of the mean wealth gain) when we increase the variable by one standard deviation. The coe$cient of forecast error in regression 1 implies that when we increase forecast error by one standard deviation the anticipation-adjusted abnormal returns increase by 147 basis points. This increase represents a large fraction (39.6%) of the mean wealth gain around spin-o!s.
Consistent with the elimination of negative synergies hypothesis, the coe$cient of the cross-industry SIC dummy is 1.459, which is signi"cant at the 10% level. The economic impact of this variable is large. From regression 1, a "rm that divests an unrelated division earns 146 basis points more than a "rm that divests a related division. This represents a 39% increase in anticipationadjusted abnormal returns. The relative size of the divested unit is also signi"-cantly positively related to the gains around spin-o! announcements, which is similar to the "nding in Miles and Rosenfeld (1983) . The economic impact of this variable computed using the coe$cient in regression 1 is nearly 32%. The only other signi"cant factor is the tax dummy, which is negative, suggesting that taxable spin-o!s have lower abnormal returns than nontaxable spin-o!s. In particular, from regression 1 we may infer that in taxable spin-o!s shareholders earn about 200 basis points less than in nontaxable spin-o!s. The coe$cient of the merger motive dummy is positive but not statistically di!erent from zero. Finally, the coe$cient of the regulation dummy is not signi"cant, which suggests that the abnormal returns are not related to the elimination of regulatory constraints.
Regressions 2 through 5 repeat the analysis of regression 1 using the di!erent information asymmetry variables successively. Consistent with the information hypothesis, all the information asymmetry variables but residual standard deviation are signi"cantly positively related to the abnormal returns. For instance, the coe$cient of the normalized forecast error variable in regression 3 is 9.700, and it is signi"cant at the 1% level. The economic impact of this variable is very large. When normalized forecast error increases by one standard deviation, anticipation-adjusted abnormal returns increase by 347 basis points. The residual standard deviation variable in regression 5 shows the weakest Table 11 Ordinary least squares regressions to explain the anticipation-adjusted abnormal returns generated around the announcement of spin-o!s for a sample of 118 "rms that completed a spin-o! in the period 1979}1993. Spin-o!s are identi"ed from the CRSP tapes, the National Automated Accounting Research System, and news wires and articles from Lexis-Nexis and the Wall Street Journal. The dependent variable is the mean two-day cumulative abnormal return generated over the interval (!1, 0) adjusted for partial anticipation of the spin-o! by the market. The anticipation-adjusted abnormal returns are calculated using the announcement-period abnormal returns measured against the CRSP value-weighted index, and using the probability of a spin-o! estimated from a logistic regression that uses the variables in model (1) of Table 10 . The forecast errors are measured in the last month of the "scal year before the announcement of the spin-o!. They are de"ned as the ratio of the absolute value of the di!erence between the actual earnings and the forecast earnings to the price per share at the beginning of the month. The standard deviation of forecasts measures the dispersion in the analysts' earnings forecasts in the month in which the forecast errors are computed. The normalized forecast errors are measured as the ratio of the forecast errors to the standard deviation of the detrended quarterly earnings in the "ve years before the announcement of the spin-o!. The announcement reaction variable is the standard deviation of the three-day cumulative abnormal returns around the announcements of quarterly earnings in the "ve year period before the announcement of the spin-o!. The residual standard deviation is the dispersion in the market-adjusted daily stock returns in the year preceding the spin-o! announcement. The cross-industry SIC dummy is 1 if the parent's primary two-digit SIC code di!ers from the subsidiary's two-digit SIC code and 0 otherwise. Unrelated entropy is the weighted average of the percentage sales of the various distinct two-digit SIC industry groups within a "rm. Relative size is the ratio of the market capitalization of the subsidiary after the spin-o! to the sum of the market capitalizations of the parent and the subsidiary, measured in the month of the completion of the spin-o!. The tax dummy is 1 if the spin-o! is taxable, and 0 otherwise. The merger dummy is 1 if the "rm states that the spin-o! was intended to facilitate the merger/acquisition of either the parent or the subsidiary with another "rm and 0 otherwise. The regulation dummy is 1 if either the parent or the subsidiary, but not both, is in an unregulated industry after the spin-o!, and 0 otherwise. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted t-statistics are in parentheses. Signi"cant at 1%.
Signi"cant at 5%. Signi"cant at 10%. Table 12 Di!erential impact of information asymmetry on anticipation-adjusted abnormal returns between "rms with high versus low levels of negative synergies across divisions in a sample of 118 "rms that completed a spin-o! in the period 1979}1993. Spin-o!s are identi"ed from the CRSP tapes, the National Automated Accounting Research System, and news wires and articles from Lexis-Nexis and the Wall Street Journal. The dependent variable is the mean two-day cumulative abnormal return generated over the interval (!1, 0) adjusted for partial anticipation of the spin-o! by the market. The anticipation-adjusted abnormal returns are calculated using the announcement-period abnormal returns measured against the CRSP value-weighted index, and using the probability of a spin-o! estimated from a logistic regression that uses the variables in model (1) of Table 10 . The forecast errors are measured in the last month of the "scal year before the announcement of the spin-o!. They are de"ned as the ratio of the absolute value of the di!erence between the actual earnings and the forecast earnings to the price per share at the beginning of the month. The standard deviation of forecasts measures the dispersion in the analysts' earnings forecasts in the month in which the forecast errors are computed. The normalized forecast errors are measured as the ratio of the forecast errors to the standard deviation of the detrended quarterly earnings in the "ve years before the announcement of the spin-o!. The announcement reaction variable is the standard deviation of the three-day cumulative abnormal returns around the announcements of quarterly earnings in the "ve year period before the announcement of the spin-o!. The residual standard deviation is the dispersion in the market-adjusted daily stock returns in the year preceding the spin-o! announcement. The cross-industry SIC dummy is 1 if the parent's primary two-digit SIC code di!ers from the subsidiary's two-digit SIC code and 0 otherwise. Relative size is the ratio of the market capitalization of the subsidiary after the spin-o! to the sum of the market capitalizations of the parent and the subsidiary, measured in the month of the completion of the spin-o!. The tax dummy is 1 if the spin-o! is taxable and 0 otherwise. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted t-statistics are in parentheses. Signi"cant at 1%.
relation with announcement period abnormal returns among the information asymmetry variables. The coe$cient of this variable, though positive, is not signi"cant at the conventional levels of signi"cance. The economic impact of this variable is only 6.5%. The regression results also o!er some support for the elimination of negative synergies hypothesis. We "nd that the coef-"cient of the cross-industry SIC dummy is positive and signi"cant in all but one regression. As before, compared to same-industry spin-o!s, the crossindustry spin-o!s earn 135 to 146 basis points more in anticipation-adjusted abnormal returns. The merger-motive dummy and the regulation dummy are not signi"cant in any of the regressions, while the relative size of the spun-o! subsidiary is signi"cantly positively related to the abnormal returns in all the regressions. Regressions 6 through 10 repeat the analysis in regressions 1 to 5 with the cross-industry dummy variable replaced by the unrelated entropy variable. As before, the information asymmetry variables are signi"cantly positively related to the abnormal returns, with the exception of regression 10. The economic impact of the variables inferred from these coe$cients are similar to those from regressions 1 through 5. The regression results o!er some support for the elimination of negative synergies hypothesis. Unrelated entropy is signi"cantly positively related to the anticipation-adjusted abnormal returns in all the "ve regressions. The economic impact of this variable ranges from 11% to 15% across the regressions. The coe$cients of the other variables are similar in magnitude and signi"cance to their counterparts in the previous regressions.
Following the approach in Chan and Lakonishok (1992) and Bhagat and Welch (1995) , we re-estimate the coe$cients in the regressions in Table 11 using the Koenker and Bassett (1978) robust regression technique. We "nd that our main inferences are, in general, una!ected, but the coe$cients of two of our measures of information asymmetry (announcement reaction and residual standard deviation) are not statistically signi"cant in the robust regressions. The coe$cients of the "rm-diversi"cation measures (cross-industry SIC dummy and unrelated entropy) are not signi"cant in one regression. These results are available from the authors upon request.
In the regressions in Table 12 , we examine whether there is a di!erence in the impact of information asymmetry on abnormal returns between "rms that have the alternative motive of eliminating negative synergies and those that do not have such a motive. To the extent that same-industry spin-o!s have few negative synergies (or even some positive synergies), the cost imposed by information asymmetry must be su$ciently high to motivate a spin-o!. We therefore expect the impact of information asymmetry on abnormal returns to be greater for the same-industry spin-o!s than for the cross-industry spin-o!s. To examine whether there is such a di!erential impact we introduce an interaction term in the regressions in Table 12 while leaving out all the insigni"cant variables from the previous regressions. The interaction of the information asymmetry variable with the cross-industry dummy measures the incremental impact of information asymmetry on abnormal returns for the subsample of cross-industry spin-o!s over the same-industry spin-o!s. The main variable of information asymmetry in this regression then measures the impact of information asymmetry on abnormal returns in the same-industry subsample. The expected sign of the main information asymmetry variable is positive, while that of the interaction term is negative.
The regression results in Table 12 indicate that information asymmetry is signi"cantly positively related to the anticipation-adjusted returns, while the interaction term is negative and signi"cant in all but regression 5. Furthermore, the magnitude of the interaction term is smaller than the magnitude of the information asymmetry term, con"rming that, while the e!ect of information asymmetry on the abnormal returns is positive for the sameindustry subsample, it is positive but smaller for the cross-industry subsample. For instance, the coe$cient of the forecast error variable in regression 1 of Table 12 is 32.556, which is signi"cantly di!erent from zero at the 5% level. The interaction coe$cient is !22.864, which is signi"cant at the 10% level. These results imply that in the same-industry spin-o! subsample the coe$cient of forecast error is 32.556, while it is 9.692 ("32.556!22.864) in the crossindustry subsample. The signi"cant interaction coe$cient suggests that there is a signi"cant di!erence in the impact of forecast error on abnormal returns between the cross-industry and same-industry spin-o!s. Regression 1 implies that an increase of one standard deviation in forecast error in the same-industry subsample increases the anticipation-adjusted abnormal returns by 391 basis points. A corresponding increase in forecast error in the crossindustry subsample results in only a 95 basis point increase in the abnormal returns.
From regression 4, the coe$cient of the announcement reaction variable is 2.143 for the same-industry spin-o!s, which is signi"cant at the 10% level. The interaction coe$cient of !2.097, which is signi"cant at the 5% level, implies that the di!erential impact of the announcement reaction variable on abnormal returns between the cross-industry and sameindustry spin-o!s is signi"cant. These coe$cients suggest that an increase of one standard deviation in the announcement reaction variable in the same-industry spin-o!s increases the anticipation-adjusted abnormal returns by 46 basis points, while a corresponding increase in the cross-industry spin-o!s results in an increase of only 11 basis points. Residual standard deviation is the only measure of information asymmetry that does not exhibit a di!erential impact on abnormal returns between the cross and same-industry subsamples. The coe$cients and the economic impact of the other variables are qualitatively similar to the corresponding regressions in Table 11 .
Conclusion
This study analyzes the role of information asymmetry in explaining the incidence of and gains associated with corporate spin-o!s. The information hypothesis argues that spin-o!s reduce information asymmetry in the market about the cash #ows and operating e$ciency of the individual divisions of a "rm. Firms that are undervalued due to information asymmetry therefore experience an improvement in market valuation when they divest through spin-o!s. Using "ve di!erent measures of information asymmetry, including analysts' earnings forecast errors and the standard deviation of the earnings forecasts, we empirically examine the premise and the implications of the information hypothesis.
We "nd that "rms that engage in spin-o!s have higher levels of information asymmetry before the spin-o! than their size-and industry-matched counterparts. We also "nd that for the sample "rms information problems decrease signi"cantly after the completion of the spin-o!. The anticipation-adjusted abnormal returns around the announcement of spin-o!s are larger for "rms with higher levels of information asymmetry. This result obtains even after controlling for the level of negative synergies between divisions of a "rm.
Furthermore, for "rms that spin o! related subsidiaries (i.e., "rms with fewer negative synergies between divisions) information problems are a more important determinant of the anticipation-adjusted abnormal returns. Thus, while negative synergies may play a role in explaining spin-o! gains, mitigation of information asymmetry is also an important factor. We do not "nd any evidence to support the regulation and the merger motives for spin-o!s. In particular, spin-o!s that potentially eliminate regulatory constraints for either the parent or the subsidiary and those undertaken to facilitate a merger do not exhibit higher announcement period abnormal returns.
Logistic regressions indicate that "rms with higher levels of information asymmetry and "rms that are highly diversi"ed have a higher likelihood of engaging in spin-o!s. We also "nd that "rms with higher growth opportunities and those that are liquidity-constrained (i.e., "rms that have a need for external capital) show a higher propensity to engage in spin-o!s, even though spin-o!s themselves generate no new capital for the "rms. Among "rms that engage in spin-o!s, both the frequency of equity issues and the total amount of capital raised increase signi"cantly in the two years following a spin-o!. This is consistent with the view that "rms improve their market value through divestitures that reduce information asymmetry before approaching the capital market for funds.
